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Bartlett: Battle Ready,

doctrine to be useful. He argues cogently
that advanced intelligence systems have
their own vulnerabilities, and that lacunae of information are inevitable both
before and during war. Moreover, by
using examples from the American Civil
War, Lowenthal demonstrates that
good information about the enemy’s
moves and intentions is not enough for
winning the battle. It is generalship, the
human factor, that will continue to be
decisive in the outcome of a war.
This is an excellent introductory collection for students and the professional
reader to the gamut of issues with
which the field of intelligence grapples.
EFRAIM INBAR

Director, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies
Bar-Ilan University, Israel

Clancy, Tom, with General Tony Zinni (Ret.) and
Tony Koltz. Battle Ready. New York: Putnam,
2004. 440pp. $28.95

This excellent book documents the military and postmilitary career of General
Tony Zinni, USMC (Ret.). It should appeal to any reader interested in the U.S.
military, the U.S. Marine Corps, and
national security affairs.
The book follows an engaging and
mixed style. Clancy and Koltz use short
biographical sections to introduce
phases of General Zinni’s career. At the
end of each phase, Zinni’s own words
(in italics) pick up the action. One has
the sense of being right there with the
general, sharing his experiences and
watching him develop into an exceptional military role model and leader.
The book actually begins with the end
of Zinni’s career. It is November 1998,
and he is halfway through his last
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assignment as the sixth commander in
chief of Central Command. We are introduced to the refined thinking of a
fighting soldier and leader, thinking
based on his extensive tactical, operational, and strategic experience in war,
conflict resolution, and peacemaking.
At that time, Zinni’s immediate focus
was Saddam Hussein and supporting
the UNSCOM (United Nations Special
Commission) inspectors under Richard
Butler. By mid-December, UN teams
began departing Iraq. What follows is
the four-day, preplanned attack of
Operation DESERT FOX. Although the
planning for the attack provides insight
into General Zinni’s war-fighting skills,
such as the importance and execution of
surprise, it is the introduction to his
breadth of strategic thinking that is most
interesting.
At the start of his command in August
1997, Zinni proposed a six-point strategic program for Central Command to
President Clinton’s secretary of defense,
William Cohen. His objective was to
take a more balanced approach to a
wide range of evolving security issues,
not just Iraq and Saddam Hussein. After presenting the program to Cohen
and senior members of Congress, Zinni
was politely told to “stay out of policy
and stick to execution.” That raises an
important point for military officers
preparing themselves for high command. Civilian control of the military
and selfless military service to the country are fundamental to our government,
going back to George Washington and
George Marshall. Based on the rest of
the book, it is apparent that Zinni consistently struck that delicate professional balance between the truthful,
informed, and forceful advice and respect for civilian authority.
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A further example of this followed
DESERT FOX. General Zinni asked himself what would happen if Iraq suddenly
collapsed. Who would pick up the
pieces and help rebuild the country? To
examine these questions, Zinni sponsored a war game called “Desert Crossing” in late 1999, with a wide range of
government agencies and representatives. In his words, “The scenarios
looked closely at humanitarian, security, political, economic, and other reconstruction issues. We looked at food,
clean water, electricity, refugees, Shia
versus Sunnis, Kurds versus other
Iraqis, Turks versus Kurds, and the
power vacuum that would surely follow
the collapse of the regime (since
Saddam had pretty successfully eliminated any local opposition). We looked
at all the problems the United States
faces in 2003 trying to rebuild Iraq. And
when it was over, I was starting to get a
good sense of their enormous scope and
to recognize how massive the reconstruction would be.” Although the
game failed to stimulate governmentwide planning, the episode at the start
of the book is compelling. One wonders
at Zinni’s background, and how he developed the interest, knowledge, and
experience to conceptualize and deal
with such complex theater-level issues.
The general served two tours in Vietnam, where he suffered life-threatening
combat wounds and illnesses. His time
there was fundamental to his development: “The biggest lesson, in fact, is
learning how to be open to surprising
new experiences and then turning that
openness into resourceful and creative
ways of dealing with challenges you
face.” Zinni builds on that insight along
with the sensitivity and ability to work
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effectively within other cultures, a skill
he developed during his first tour as an
adviser with the South Vietnamese
marines.
Zinni’s rise to the rank of general in
December 1986 followed command,
staff, and professional military education assignments, emphasizing operational competence. However, it is his
first assignment as general to deputy director of operations at the U.S. European Command in 1990 that impressed
upon him the nature of the rapidly
changing world following the collapse
of the Soviet Union.
The reader is taken through Zinni’s
subsequent assignments: director of operations for Combined Task Force RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, commander of
the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force
(I MEF), and commander in chief of
Central Command. After his retirement
from the military in the summer of
2000, Zinni’s experience and diplomatic
skills are further called into service for
peacemaking and conflict resolution
around the world, offering us further
insight into such complex, ongoing situations as the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict.
Battle Ready makes clear that Zinni has
the credentials, both professional and
personal, to present his forceful and
unvarnished opinions, honed by a lifetime of service to his country. This
book should be of particular value to
military officers of all services preparing
for higher command in this volatile
world.
HENRY BARTLETT

Naval War College
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